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Abstract
Corporate divestitures have been identified as important strategic
actions with a positive impact on firm performance. Yet, what is still missing
in the strategic management literature is an integrative framework that
quantitatively synthesizes the relative impact of various antecedents to
divestitures, and theoretically reconciles the multitude of theories underlying
divestiture research. To fill this gap, the author conducts a meta-analysis
(based on a sample of 35 studies) and develops four broad categories of
determinants: corporate governance; firm strategy; performance; and
industry environment. Evidence is found that divestitures are driven mainly
by prior divestment experience, structural factors (firm size and firm
diversification) and weak unit performance. In addition, the relative predictive
validity of several theoretical perspectives on divestment decisions is
assessed.
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Introduction
Corporate divestitures are major strategic decisions with
important implications for firm competitiveness and profitability.
Divestitures represent adjustments to a firm's ownership and business
portfolio structure via a sell-off, spin-off and carve-out of a business
unit, or sale of corporate assets (Brauer, 2006; Mulherin and Boone,
2000). Following prior research, I use the terms ‘divestitures’,
‘divesting’, ‘divestment’ and ‘divestment activity’ interchangeably in
this paper.
Existing research provides evidence that divestitures alleviate
problems of misallocation of corporate resources (Hoskisson and
Johnson, 1992), improve managerial ability to coordinate a leaner
organization (Hoskisson and Turk, 1990) and increase profitability (Lee
and Madhavan, 2010). As such, divestitures strengthen internal
structural arrangements and improve the competitive position in the
external environment.
Despite the positive effects of divestitures, managers may be
reluctant to undertake them, since they often come at a personal cost.
First, divestitures might require the admission of prior mistakes and
inappropriate strategies (e.g. McNamara, Moon and Bromiley, 2002).
Second, divesting is inconsistent with the growth goals of managers
(Donaldson and Lorsch, 1983), since it typically reduces firm size and
managerial compensation. Finally, since divestitures lead to major
structural changes in the firm, they generate intense political issues
and resistance inside and outside the firm (Dial and Murphy, 1995).
Since a decision to divest has important and beneficial strategic
implications, but can be difficult to undertake, there are both
theoretical and practical benefits in understanding the factors that
facilitate or hinder divestitures. However, there are three factors that
limit the ability to draw strong conclusions about divestiture
antecedents from the extant literature. While prior research has
identified a broad number of antecedents, the latter have usually been
studied in isolation, with little focus on developing an integrative
framework of divestiture determinants. In addition, there is empirical
disagreement on the strength and sign of the relationship between
certain antecedents and divestitures. Finally, while multiple theoretical
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perspectives have been used to study divestitures, there is still a lack
of consensus on which of them have the strongest predictive power
regarding divestitures.
To fill this gap, I conduct a meta-analytic review, which
develops an integrative framework of the most common divestiture
drivers, reconciles existing empirical inconsistencies on the
relationships between antecedents and divestitures, and synthesizes
the theories best suited to explain divestitures. I aim to make several
contributions to the literature.
First, contrary to the majority of existing divestiture research
that studies the divestment decision in isolation, I build an integrative
framework, arguing that divestitures are driven by factors related to
internal inefficiencies and weak structural arrangements, and
suboptimal conditions in the external environment. In particular, I
build on prior theorizing (Brauer, 2006; Johnson, 1996) to suggest
four broad categories of divestiture antecedents: corporate
governance; firm strategy; performance; and industry environment
determinants.
Second, via a meta-analysis I can obtain more robust effects,
discuss with greater confidence the results obtained, and make
broader generalizations on the validity of findings across various
samples and research conditions. Also, with a meta-analysis I can
resolve conflicting findings in existing research. For example, while
some studies report a negative relationship between firm performance
and divestitures (Hoskisson, Johnson and Moesel, 1994; Shimizu and
Hitt, 2005), others find a positive one (Berry, 2010; Quigley and
Hambrick, 2012). Similarly, some studies identify a positive
association between managerial equity and divestitures (Chatterjee,
Harrison and Bergh, 2003), but others provide evidence for a negative
relationship (Sanders, 2001; Shimizu, 2007). Finally, I can assess the
relative importance of different factors affecting divestitures and the
predictive validity of their underlying theories.
Overall, this study allows the following questions to be
answered: To what extent do various antecedents that can be derived
from commonly used theories drive divestitures? Which commonly
used theories are best suited to explain divestment decisions?
[Citation Journal/Monograph Title, Vol XX, No. XX (m yyyy): pg. XX-XX. DOI. This article is © [Publisher’s Name] and
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. [Publisher’s Name] does not grant
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from
[Publisher’s Name].]

3

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

The paper is organized as follows. I begin by describing the overall
framework of divestiture determinants and develop hypotheses on the
factors affecting divestitures. Then, I describe the methodological
approach, followed by the results. I conclude with a discussion of the
findings, limitations and suggestions for future research.

Theory and hypotheses
Divestitures are major strategic decisions with critical
implications for the firm's structure, competitive strategy and
performance (Brauer, 2006). In other words, divestitures could be
viewed as means to achieve optimal structural arrangements within
the firm and strong competitive position in the external environment.
Addressing these two objectives probably puts the firm in a better
position to compete, achieve a competitive advantage and enhance
profitability. If managers are to fulfill those two objectives, they need
to focus on factors facilitating or hindering divestitures in order to
achieve internal firm efficiency and external environmental
adaptability. Subsequently, from a strategic management perspective,
it is not only important to outline the antecedents of divestitures, but
also to categorize them in a theoretical framework. Ultimately, I posit
that divestitures are driven by factors related to: (a) internal
inefficiencies and weak structural arrangements; and (b) suboptimal
conditions in the external environment. Developing such a model of
divestiture antecedents is consistent with several prior articles on
divestitures (Brauer, 2006; Johnson, 1996; Moschieri and Mair, 2008),
which have followed this internal–external framework and have argued
for four broad categories of factors influencing divestitures: corporate
governance determinants; firm strategy determinants; performance
determinants; and industry environment determinants. Using this
framework not only allows me to examine the magnitude of effect
sizes for each of these antecedent factors, but also helps outline which
of these categories has the highest predictive validity in terms of firms’
engagement in divestiture activities. Furthermore, each of these
categories of factors has been strongly related to a specific theory or
theories, and the incorporation of the latter into the proposed
framework could serve as a means of synthesis and assessment of the
validity of those theories as they apply to corporate divestitures (cf.
Sleesman et al., 2012).
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In particular, I posit that firm factors such as strategy and
performance determinants will have the strongest impact on
divestitures, followed by corporate factors (corporate governance
determinants) and industry environment determinants. These
arguments are based on the idea that managers have greater control
over internal firm factors, which would allow them to use divestitures
in response to deficiencies in those internal factors. In addition, prior
research on the role of corporate and industry factors (McGahan and
Porter, 1997, 2002; Misangyi et al., 2006) provides evidence that
those factors matter less in driving firm strategic behavior.
Below I elaborate on each category of factors influencing divestitures.

Corporate governance determinants
Corporate governance determinants have been the most studied
divestiture antecedents in prior research. The unifying theme among
all governance determinants is that they influence the motivation and
discretion of managers to undertake divestitures. Since divestitures
generally benefit shareholders, but involve cognitive dissonance and
managerial reluctance to implement (Dial and Murphy, 1995), the
effectiveness of firm governance factors is likely to have an impact on
the likelihood of divestitures (Sanders, 2001). The underlying theory
behind the relationship between corporate governance factors and
divestitures is agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). At the
heart of agency theory lies the conflict of interests between
shareholders and managers and the potential means through which
these interests could converge. While shareholders strive for higher
returns and wealth maximization, managers are self-interested and
may engage in actions to increase personal wealth even at
shareholders’ expense. Without proper controls over managers, their
actions could seriously affect firm wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
For example, driven by self-serving objectives for firm growth
(Donaldson and Lorsch, 1983), maintaining the status quo (Lant,
Milliken and Batra, 1992), and reluctance to admit prior mistakes
(McNamara, Moon and Bromiley, 2002), managers are reluctant to
divest corporate divisions even if the latter are underperforming.
However, with proper governance mechanisms in place, managers are
more likely to engage in divestment activities. I examine the following
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governance variables: boards of directors; large external shareholders;
separation of CEO and board chairman positions (no duality); and
managerial equity.
The theoretical argument behind the first three factors follows
agency theory logic. More specifically, the stronger those governance
mechanisms, the more likely firms will engage in shareholderbeneficial strategies, such as divestitures. For example, the level of
(in)dependence of directors from executives, and especially the CEO,
is particularly important for boards to fulfill their fiduciary duties. When
the board is dominated by outsiders, they are more independent of the
CEO and are more likely to challenge inefficient strategies and force
the CEO to initiate actions which create shareholder value (cf. Kroll,
Walters and Wright, 2008).
Similarly, the existence of large external shareholders serves as
an effective monitoring mechanism that increases the interest
alignment between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling,
1976). External shareholders possess sizeable shares in the firm and
have the leverage to exercise pressure on managers (Schnatterly,
Shaw and Jennings, 2008) to execute value-enhancing strategies
consistent with shareholders’ interests (Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993).
In addition, CEOs who also serve as the chairman of the board
(or position of duality) will be more likely to discourage divestitures for
two reasons. First, because CEOs with duality have considerable
influence over board members, they could filter information to board
members and control the agenda of board meetings and deliberations
in the boardroom (Finkelstein and D'Aveni, 1994). Thus, they are able
to divert attention away from CEO-sensitive topics, such as potential
divestitures of poorly performing divisions. Additionally, duality
undermines directors’ ability and motivation to monitor the CEO.
Owing to fear of CEO retaliation, directors are less inclined to question
CEO decisions, even if they consider those decisions inappropriate
(Westphal and Bednar, 2005). Considering that CEOs are interested in
maintaining the status quo and preserving their firms intact (Lant,
Milliken and Batra, 1992), the duality position gives them strong power
to prevent attempts at divesting corporate divisions.
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The final antecedent factor under this category is managerial
equity. When managers possess firm shares, they become partial
owners of the firm, and their income is tied to its performance. This
creates incentives for managers to pursue strategies that are beneficial
for shareholders and for their personal wealth (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone
and Franco-Santos, 2010). As such, classical agency theory suggests
that managerial equity could align the interests of managers and
shareholders (Dalton et al., 2003) and encourage implementation of
value-increasing activities, including divestitures.
However, findings from other domains in management challenge
the above arguments. More specifically, I draw on research of selfidentification and socio-emotional wealth to argue that managerial
equity reduces the likelihood of divesting. Prior research shows that
firm ownership leads to stronger managers’ identification with their
organization (French and Rosenstein, 1984) which enhances their
emotional attachment to the firm, often called socio-emotional wealth
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). This emotional attachment could lead to
decision biases where managers favor strategies inconsistent with
economic efficiency rationales. For example, Gomez-Mejia and
colleagues (2007) find evidence that, in order to maintain their
attachment with the organization (socio-emotional wealth), individuals
are willing to sacrifice economic performance.
Translating this logic to divestitures, I argue that managerial
ownership of the firm will reduce their willingness to dispose of firm
assets, despite the fact that this decision is justified by performance
improvements. Being partial owners helps managers to identify
strongly with the firm, and this identification generates substantial
non-economic benefits (Ashforth and Mael, 1989). In this case,
divesting corporate assets (which enhances financial outcomes) could
be viewed as secondary in priority to maintaining the firm intact
(which is beneficial to self-identification with and attachment to the
firm). Additionally, ownership enhances managerial influence over
other firm stakeholders. Managers with large ownership stakes are
able to obscure information about underperforming units, downplay
the seriousness of units’ financial failures and fend off internal and
external pressures to divest those units (e.g. Gomez-Mejia, NunezNickel and Guttierez, 2001).
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Overall, I offer the following hypothesis regarding the impact of
corporate governance determinants on divestitures:

H1:
Firms will engage in more divestment activity if: (a) their boards
are outsider-dominated; (b) there are large external
shareholders; (c) there is no CEO duality; and (d) managerial
equity is low.

Firm strategy determinants
Firm strategy has a major impact on the firm's ability to
compete and is dependent on the firm's existing structural
characteristics and accumulated experiences and routines. These
structural arrangements and organizational experiences facilitate or
hinder the firm in devising and implementing important strategic
activities. Considering that divestitures are major strategic actions with
strong performance implications (Lee and Madhavan, 2010), I posit
that these two elements (structural characteristics and organizational
experiences) of a firm's strategy will be important determinants of
corporate divestitures (Johnson, 1996).
Under structural arrangements, I examine level of
diversification, firm size and prior acquisitions, arguing that these
factors contribute significantly to internal (in)efficiency. A common
theoretical framework that could integrate the above factors is
portfolio theory (Duhaime and Grant, 1984; Markides, 1992). Its main
focus is on internal efficiencies and efficient management of corporate
units within diversified corporations. In addition, the theory is
concerned with the means and mechanisms through which managers
could achieve appropriate and beneficial internal organizational
structures and design. Thus, portfolio theory could view divestitures as
means for solving suboptimal and inefficient forms of internal
organizing.
Level of diversification is associated with a bigger number and
more diverse divisions within the firm. Thus, a highly diversified firm is
less dependent on a single division, and it becomes easier to divest the
latter, especially when it experiences poor performance. Additionally,
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beyond a certain level of diversification, firms begin to experience
problems stemming from loss of control and misallocation of corporate
resources (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987), inefficiencies (Hoskisson
and Turk, 1990) and increased bureaucratic costs (Nayyar, 1992).
Ultimately, as diversification increases, the organizational structure
becomes more difficult to manage and more complex, which inhibits
information-processing capabilities and translates into loss of
corporate value (e.g. Berger and Ofek, 1995).
Similarly, firm size is associated with additional inefficiencies in
managing the firm. Increasing firm boundaries inhibits executives’
ability to manage its operations and procedures effectively. Larger size
translates into higher levels of complexity, which undermine corporate
control. Size also generates rigidity and tunnel vision (Miller and Chen,
1994), which inhibit the firm's awareness and quick response to
market rivals. This jeopardizes the firm's ability to compete and
ultimately leads to loss of competitive advantages. To counteract those
tendencies, managers may downsize by divesting assets (e.g. Decker
and Mellewigt, 2012).
Acquisitions are a common growth strategy that leads to
increased levels of diversification and size, raising the complexity of
the firm and thus placing more coordination and control burdens on
managers (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987). Also, acquiring other
companies requires additional efforts for the successful incorporation
of those companies within the existing portfolio of businesses in the
focal firm. This, however, diverts managerial attention away from the
core organizational activities and generates costs associated with the
integration of the newly added businesses into the existing lines of the
firm's activities (e.g. Cannella and Hambrick, 1993). In general, to
reduce inefficiencies, bureaucracy and complexity stemming from
more diversification, larger size and numerous acquisitions, managers
may engage in divestitures.
Organizational experiences are an important determinant of
future firm behavior, because those experiences are incorporated into
existing routines and practices and facilitate managerial decisionmaking (Haleblian, Kim and Rajagopalan, 2006). Through prior
divestitures, managers generate useful experiences and lessons that
guide them in their future engagement in divestitures. The theory that
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underlies research on organization experiences is organizational
learning theory (Levitt and March, 1988). It argues that firm strategic
behavior is driven by organizational routines that are established
through prior managerial experiences (Nelson and Winter, 1982). The
more experienced managers become with a particular strategic action,
the more confidence they gain, and the more likely they are to repeat
that action (Haleblian, Kim and Rajagopalan, 2006).
When managers have engaged in divestitures, they become
familiar with the process of divesting, which becomes institutionalized
and enters the organization's set of routines (Nelson and Winter,
1982). The existence of routines generates a consistent pattern of
conducting activities and creates pressure for managers to follow these
patterns. Combined with the fact that divestitures generally
accumulate firm wealth (Lee and Madhavan, 2010), this suggests that
prior divestitures encourage managers to undertake additional
divestitures in the future. Overall, the cumulative effects of divestiture
experience and expected divestiture success may bolster managers’
confidence in implementing subsequent divestitures, despite their
inherent complexity. In support of this argument, prior research finds
that experience with different types of major reorganizational changes
in the firm is positively related to future such changes (Haleblian, Kim
and Rajagopalan, 2006).

H2:
Firms will engage in more divestment activity if: (a) the firm is
more diversified; (b) the firm is larger; (c) the firm has
previously undertaken a larger number of acquisitions; and (d)
the firm has previously completed a larger number of
divestitures.

Performance determinants
One of the most commonly studied antecedents to divestitures
has been prior performance at both the corporate and the unit level.
Prior research argues that poor performance indicates organizational
efficiency problems, and divestitures are used to reduce such problems
(Johnson, 1996; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987). A theoretical
framework that integrates the performance determinants of
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divestitures is the behavioral theory of the firm (BTOF) (Cyert and
March, 1963). The BTOF argues that managerial behavior is influenced
by performance feedback obtained by comparing performance
aspiration levels against current performance (Greve, 2003). When
performance is strong and firms possess solid financial resources, they
are less likely to deviate from their current routines and practices, thus
enforcing managerial persistence and preservation of the status quo
(Greve, 2003). However, when performance is below those
aspirations, firms engage in a search for solutions to return to initially
aspired levels of performance. Hence, prior poor performance leads to
dissatisfaction with the status quo and forces managers to engage in
change, such as divestitures. Furthermore, poor corporate
performance is usually accompanied with weak balance sheets and
inability to invest in new projects and innovate. In order to generate
the funds necessary to pay debts or invest in new strategies, firms
may decide to divest unprofitable corporate assets. As such,
divestitures may serve as a tool to strengthen the financial position of
the firm and achieve corporate efficiency. Additionally, strong
corporate performance is an indication that current strategies are
effective, and there is no need to make changes in corporate scope
(Iyer and Miller, 2008).
Prior unit performance is also a strong driver of divestitures.
When a corporate unit is underperforming, it sends a negative signal
to corporate executives about its ability to achieve operational
efficiency and gain competitive advantage. Thus, this unit is perceived
as a burden to the entire organization by draining valuable corporate
resources, and therefore should be divested (e.g. Brauer, 2008;
Shimizu, 2007). Furthermore, since corporate units are evaluated on
future prospects and on meeting internal financial criteria (e.g.
Thomas and Waring, 1999), poor unit financial results reflect the
inability of the unit to meet performance aspirations, which
encourages its divestment.
Another factor closely related to prior performance is corporate
resources or slack. When a firm is performing well and generates
strong cash flows, it can build and set aside additional resources. To
the contrary, a firm in financial distress is less likely to possess slack
resources. In general, the availability of slack resources serves as a
buffer and reduces the firm's sensitivity to performance misfortunes
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and willingness to engage in major changes (Palmer and Wiseman,
1999). This large pool of slack resources leads managers to maintain
the status quo and not change existing organizational structures and
firm boundaries. However, when corporate resources are depleted,
‘managers may increase efforts at raising resource levels through
various risk-laden actions’ (Palmer and Wiseman, 1999, p. 1043),
including major strategic moves, such as divestitures.

H3:
Firms will engage in more divestment activity if: (a) prior
corporate performance is low; (b) prior unit performance is low;
and (c) slack is low.

Industry environment determinants
Industry characteristics affect the level of fit between the firm
and its external environment and influence the amount of
organizational change necessary to adapt to the environmental
context. As a result, environmental factors have a direct bearing on
managerial alertness to external conditions, assessment of the firm's
fit with the environment, and the need for strategic changes
(Wiersema and Bantel, 1993). The theoretical perspective that
examines how industry conditions affect firm conduct and strategy is
industrial organizational economics (IO economics) (Bain, 1968;
Porter, 1980). In the context of divestitures, IO economics would
suggest that the strategic decision to divest is driven by the industry
structure in which the firm operates. More specifically, unfavorable
conditions, such as increasing environmental uncertainty and
decreasing or low environmental munificence, are likely to drive more
divestitures.
Environmental uncertainty is associated with a high degree of
unpredictability in the environment, which presents many unclear
situations to organizational decision-makers (Duncan, 1972). Highly
uncertain environments are characterized by instability and consistent
changes that place ‘tremendous cognitive demands’ (Wiersema and
Bantel, 1993 p. 488) on decision-makers and limit their ability to
conduct appropriate evaluation of the external conditions and their fit
with the firm. Thus, in highly uncertain settings, managers have great
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difficulty developing their plans (conduct) in the market. This
uncertainty is unsettling and reduces managers’ ability to govern the
firm efficiently (Bergh and Lawless, 1998) and, ultimately, raises the
costs of hierarchical governance. A common approach to reducing
those costs is for managers to focus internally and simplify
organization structures (e.g. Palmer and Wiseman, 1999) by divesting
corporate units (Keats and Hitt, 1988).
Environmental munificence is characterized by the availability of
resources and the ability of the environment to support growth (Dess
and Beard, 1984). Thus, highly munificent environments serve as a
buffer from external hostilities (Wiersema and Bantel, 1993), reduce
managers’ alertness, and lead them to maintain the status quo in their
firms. Alternatively, munificent markets provide more opportunities for
managers to improve the performance of relatively weak divisions, and
thus reduce the likelihood of divestiture of those divisions. In contrast,
low environmental munificence leads to scarcity of resources and
increased threats faced by managers. Simply stated, low-munificence
industries do not provide a buffer against environmental hostilities
(Parks and Conlon, 1995), have higher rates of rivalry and lower profit
potential, and may encourage managers to engage in cost-cutting and
restructuring activities, including divestitures. Stated formally:

H4:
Firms will engage in more divestment activity if: (a)
environmental uncertainty is high; and (b) environmental
munificence is low.

Methods
Sample
To identify the population of papers that tested the relationships
between various antecedents and divestitures, searches for relevant
articles were conducted in several databases, such as ABI/INFORM
COMPLETE, ISI Web of Science, JSTOR, Business Source Premier and
Academy of Management Proceedings. I focused only on published
studies,1 as recent theorizing finds strong evidence that the omission
of unpublished work or the file drawer problem ‘does not produce an
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inflation bias and does not pose a serious threat to the validity of
meta-analytically derived conclusions’ (Dalton et al., 2012 p. 221).
Furthermore, I relied only on peer-reviewed journals and left out
books and book chapters. As a result, I identified 192 articles
addressing divestitures and, after careful review, 35 studies were
included (see Appendix Studies used in the meta-analysis), 158
relevant samples and total N = 188,078 for the antecedents–
divestitures association. I did not specify a starting year of publications
for the search, but the earliest articles coded dated back to 1986, and
the latest ones were published in 2015. While I identified a large
sample of studies based on the keyword searches, the number of
studies that I could use for this inquiry was reduced for several
reasons. Most importantly, the majority of divestiture research
examined the performance implications of divestitures, rather than the
antecedents of divestitures, rendering those studies unusable for the
study. Additionally, a number of the articles were either theoretical in
nature or lacked necessary data, such as sample size or correlation
coefficients, to be meta-analyzed. I would like to acknowledge that,
while the total sample of 35 articles is smaller than a recent metaanalysis on the performance implications of divestiture (Lee and
Madhavan (2010) used 94 studies), it is comparable to other metaanalyses (e.g. Dalton et al., 1999; Deutsch, 2005).

Inclusion criteria
While I strived to be broad and comprehensive by expanding
beyond the management literature and including research in the
accounting and finance fields, I had to remain focused and exclude
academic fields that might have fundamentally different approaches to
the divestiture construct (e.g. research treating employee lay-offs as
divestment activities). As a result, I decided to follow prior metaanalytic research in the strategic management field with regard to the
selection of journals (e.g. Dalton et al., 1998, 1999; King et al.,
2004): see Table 1.
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Table 1. List of journals used to identify divestiture studies
Journal name

Impact factora

Academy of Management Journal

4.974

Accounting Review

2.234

Administrative Science Quarterly

2.394

Applied Financial Economics

0.64b

British Journal of Management

1.909

Financial Management

0.873

Journal of Accounting Research

2.449

Journal of Business

NA

Journal of Business Finance & Accounting

1.261

Journal of Finance

6.033

Journal of Financial Economics

3.759

Journal of Financial Research

NA

Journal of Management

6.862

Journal of Management Studies

3.277

Managerial and Decision Economics

1.07c

Organization Science

3.807

Strategic Management Journal

2.993

Strategic Organization

1.853

aThe

impact factor is for 2013.
impact factor for 2011.
cAverage impact factor over three-year period.
bAverage

The key search words were derived in accordance with the
various definitions of divestitures presented in prior review articles
(Brauer, 2006; Johnson, 1996). The computer-aided search was based
on the following keywords: divest, divestiture, divestment, spin-off,
carve-out, split-up, sell-off, dediversification, refocusing, downscoping,
disbanding, abandonment, and firm exit. In addition, I examined the
reference lists of the potentially applicable articles for additional
studies that might not have been identified through the database
search. To be included in the lists, those studies had to include a
correlation between the variables of interest or statistical data
sufficient to calculate correlations. In addition, I included correlation
coefficients only from studies in which I could conclude a causal
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relationship between the antecedent variables and divestitures. That
is, I included correlation coefficients only when the antecedent
variables temporarily preceded the divestiture event (e.g. antecedent
variables were measured at time t−1 and divestitures occurred at time
t). Finally, I needed at least three studies to estimate the relationship
between a particular antecedent and divestitures.

Coding
The initial step in the coding process included several meetings
between the author and three additional coders, where we outlined
coding rules and jointly coded seven articles. After the coders had
become familiar with the coding procedures, the remaining articles
were split among the author and the three coders for independent
coding. I randomly selected several articles that were coded by
everyone, and any discrepancies were resolved through additional
discussions.
A list of the dependent and all independent variables and their
definitions is provided in Table 2.
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Table 2. Description of dependent and independent variables
Variable
name

Description

Dependent variable
Divestment
activity

Existence of divestiture(s) (coded as 1 if there was a divestiture and
0 otherwise); number of units or divisions divested; number of
divestitures and divestment intensity (ratio of divested assets to
total corporate assets).
Independent variables

Outsiderdominated
board

Ratio of independent to total number of directors (Dalton et al.,
1998).

Large external
shareholders

Number of blockholders, blockholder equity and institutional equity
combined together. Blockholders represent the number of
shareholders with at least 5% stake in the company. Blockholder
equity is the percentage corporate shares owned by shareholders
with at least 5% stake in the company. Institutional equity is the
amount of corporate shares owned by institutional investors, such
as pension funds, mutual funds, and hedge funds, divided by the
number of outstanding corporate sharesa (Brickley, Lease and
Smith, 1988).

Managerial
equity

Amount of stock owned by the CEO and insider directorsb (Dalton
et al., 2003).

Duality

A dummy variable coded as 1 if the CEO and board chairman
positions are held by the same person and 0 otherwise (Boyd,
1995).

Prior
acquisitions

Number of acquisitions conducted by the firm in prior periods.

Prior
divestitures

Number of divestitures conducted by the firm in prior periods.

Firm slack
resources

Slack resources have been operationalized as absorbed slack
(selling, general and administrative expenses over sales),
unabsorbed slack (current assets to current liabilities), potential
slack (inverse ratio of debt to equity), and free cash flow ((operating
income – taxes – interest expense – depreciation – preferred
dividend – common dividend)/equity) (Bourgeois, 1981; Haleblian
et al., 2012).

Prior corporate
performance

Relied on multiple operationalizations used in prior research, such as
return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), return on sales
(ROS), and Tobin's Q (Greve, 2003).

Prior unit
performance

Return on assets at the unit level (ROA) (e.g. Greve, 2003).
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Table 2. Description of dependent and independent variables
Variable
name

Description

Level of
diversification

Entropy index (ΣPi ln(1/Pi), where Pi is the sales attributed to
segment i, and ln(1/Pi), the logarithm of the inverse of sales, is the
weight for each segment i. (Jacquemin and Berry, 1979).

Firm size

Logarithm of firm assets or sales (Iyer and Miller, 2008).

Dynamism

Standard errors of regression coefficient, obtained from regressing
total industry sales over year-counter variable, divided by mean
industry sales (Dess and Beard, 1984).

Munificence

Regression coefficient, obtained from regressing total industry sales
over year-counter variable, divided by mean industry sales (Dess
and Beard, 1984).

aUsing

each of these three elements separately did not change the significance of
the results.
bWhen

inside directors’ stock ownership and CEO stock ownership were used
separately, similar results were obtained, with the only exception that CEO stock
ownership was significant for 90% confidence interval.

Meta-analytic procedures
Meta-analysis is a technique that allows the true relationship
between two variables to be estimated across separate samples. This
estimate (or effect size) is a mean correlation coefficient derived from
the correlation coefficients of all samples by weighting the sample size
of each study. The observed zero-order coefficient provides a more
accurate estimation of the population mean because various statistical
artifacts are corrected and positive and negative sampling errors are
eliminated (Hunter and Schmidt, 1990). In this meta-analysis, I
estimated effect sizes through the correlation coefficient r, which is
used primarily in meta-analyses and has the advantages of easy
interpretation and small downward bias (Aguinis et al., 2011;
Geyskens et al., 2009). A main part of any meta-analysis is the
calculation of the standard errors, which allows for the examination of
correlation variability and the creation of confidence intervals
(Whitener, 1990). If the confidence interval for a given correlation
coefficient does not include zero, it could be concluded that there is a
statistically significant association between the variables under
investigation. To conduct the statistical analysis, I relied on Hunter and
Schmidt's (1990, 2004) psychometric analytic procedure to derive the
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mean correlation scores. This method relies on a random-effects
model, which is the preferred approach because it assumes that
population effect sizes vary across samples and provides appropriate
type I error rate (Geyskens et al., 2009; Kepes et al., 2012). In
addition to correcting for sampling errors, Hunter and Schmidt (1990)
advise addressing several artifacts, such as measurement error,
dichotomization of a truly continuous variable and range restriction.
Since the variables in the meta-analysis are objective and no reliability
statistics are given, I followed prior research and used a reliability
level of 0.8 (Dalton et al., 1999).2 Range restrictions were set at 1
(Lee and Madhavan, 2010). No study in the meta-analysis included a
dichotomization of a truly continuous variable. Finally, I inspected the
data for outliers through schematic plots and did not identify outliers
to be a problem in the study.

Robustness check
There have been concerns about non-independence in metaanalyses and the impact of pooling multiple correlation coefficients
from a single study (Lee and Madhavan, 2010). I handled this issue in
the following manner. First, if a study reported multiple measures of
the dependent and/or independent variables and thus multiple
correlations, I averaged those correlations. As a robustness check, I
also conducted analyses based on only one correlation coefficient and
on all correlation coefficients from a single study (Geyskens et al.,
2009). The results remained the same. In addition, I checked whether
different operationalizations of the antecedent variables produced
similar results. Overall, findings were consistent with those reported
here.
Finally, as an additional robustness analysis, I addressed
potential publication bias (the file drawer effect). Such bias is present
when the probability of a study being published is dependent on the
magnitude, direction or significance of the study's results (Begg,
1994). I employed Duval and Tweedie's (2000) ‘trim and fill’ method.
Findings indicate that publication bias is not a serious issue for the
meta-analysis.
In summary, the robustness of the results is consistent with
prior evidence suggesting that methodological approach and ‘judgment
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calls involved in the conduct of a meta-analysis have little impact on
the resulting … effect sizes’ (Aguinis et al., 2011 p. 5).

Results
Table 3 presents a summary of the results for the hypothesized
relationships. Hypothesis 1 relates to the impact of corporate
governance mechanisms on divestitures. Overall, I find weak support
for it. In line with my theorizing, results show that outsider-dominated
boards are positively associated with divestitures (ρ = 0.07, k = 9, N
= 3747), and greater managerial equity leads to fewer divestitures (ρ
= −0.11, k = 6, N = 2311). Large external shareholders and CEO
duality do not have a statistically significant effect on divestitures. In
Hypothesis 2, I theorized on the impact of firm strategy determinants
on divestitures. Overall, this hypothesis was supported, since level of
diversification (ρ = 0.09, k = 19, N = 27,162), firm size (ρ = 0.33, k =
27, N = 53,008) and prior divestitures (ρ = 0.53, k = 6, N = 13,783)
lead to increased subsequent divestment activity. I did not find
statistically significant correlation between prior acquisitions and
subsequent divestitures. Hypothesis 3 discussed the role of
performance determinants on divestitures. I found that prior unit
performance (ρ = −0.18, k = 4, N = 1750) and slack resources (ρ =
−0.04, k = 24, N = 24,771) exhibit a negative association with
divestitures, which supports my theorizing. However, prior corporate
performance did not affect divestitures in a statistically significant way.
Finally, I find no support for Hypothesis 4, since results show no
statistically significant association between environmental
uncertainty/munificence and divestitures.
Table 3. Meta-analytic results of the various antecedents to corporate divestitures a
Variable

Supported

N

k

R

Ρ

SD

95% CI

90% CV

Corporate governance (H1)
OutsiderYes
dominated board

3747 9

0.05

0.07 0.00

Large external
shareholders

6602 14

0.02

0.03 0.08 −0.02

0.07

0.07

0.08 −0.08

0.13

Managerial equity Yes

2311 6 −0.08 −0.11 0.03 −0.15 −0.06 −0.14

−0.07

Duality

1252 3 −0.03 −0.04 0.00 −0.09

−0.04

No

No

0.03

0.10

0.02 −0.04
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Table 3. Meta-analytic results of the various antecedents to corporate divestitures a
Variable

Supported

N

k

R

Ρ

SD

95% CI

90% CV
Firm strategy (H2)

Level of
diversification

Yes

27,162 19

0.07

0.09 0.10

0.04

0.14 −0.04

0.22

Firm size

Yes

53,008 27

0.27

0.33 0.34

0.20

0.46 −0.10

0.77

7126 8

0.026

0.032 0.17 −0.09

0.15 −0.19

0.25

13,783 6

0.42

0.53 0.28

0.75

0.17

0.89

29,633 24

0.02

0.02 0.10 −0.02

0.06 −0.11

0.15

Prior acquisitions No
Prior divestitures Yes

0.30

Performance (H3)
Prior corporate
performance

No

Prior unit
performance

Yes

1750 4 −0.14 −0.18 0.08 −0.27 −0.08 −0.28

−0.07

Firm slack
resources

Yes

24,771 24 −0.03 −0.04 0.06 −0.07 −0.01 −0.12

0.04

Industry environment (H4)
Environmental
Uncertainty

No

Environmental
Munificence

No

3634 7

0.01

0.01 0.14 −0.10

0.13 −0.17

0.20

13,299 7 −0.003 −0.003 0.00 −0.02

0.01 −0.003

−0.003

aN

= combined sample size; k = number of correlations; r = raw score
correlation; ρ = corrected true score population correlation; SD = standard
deviation of true score population correlation; CI = confidence interval; CV =
credibility interval.

In addition to the hypothesized relationships, I also conducted
some exploratory analyses of moderating conditions.3 In particular, I
was able to identify two moderating conditions (as with the main
analyses, I needed at least three studies to perform moderation
analyses). The first moderating condition is period of divestitures
(before and after 1990). Prior research argues that, during the 1980s,
there were significant changes in the market for corporate control
(Gibbs, 1993) and a strong push for refocusing (Chatterjee, Harrison
and Bergh, 2003). The second moderating condition is whether the
study was based on single-industry or multiple-industry data. The
results are presented in Appendix Moderation analyses of the
relationship between antecedents and corporate divestitures. The
majority of the confidence intervals overlap, which prevents us from
stating any statistically significant difference in results. I found
statistically significant results for level of diversification before and
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after 1990, firm size before and after 1990, and prior corporate
performance before and after 1990. Those results suggest that, before
1990, managers were more sensitive to and responded more strongly
to performance shortfalls and inefficient internal arrangements by
divesting. In addition, firm size had a significantly stronger association
with corporate divestitures when data came from a single industry
compared with multiple industries.

Discussion
In this meta-analysis I developed an integrative framework for
organizing divestiture antecedents, identifying the strongest predictors
of divestitures, and outlining the underlying theories behind the
decision to divest. Drawing on the idea that divestitures help firms
improve internal organizational inefficiencies and adapt successfully to
suboptimal external environment conditions, I argued that it is
necessary to focus on and examine factors facilitating or hindering
divestitures in order to achieve those two objectives. As a result, I
build a framework where divestitures are driven by internal factors
(corporate governance determinants, firm strategy determinants and
performance determinants) and external factors (industry environment
determinants). In addition, the meta-analysis allowed me to answer
the two research questions: ‘To what extent do various antecedents
that can be derived from commonly used theories drive divestitures?’
and ‘Which commonly used theories are best suited to explain
divestment decisions?’ The results indicate that divestitures are largely
driven by factors residing within the firm and the corporate unit rather
than the external environment. In addition, inefficient structural
arrangements, weak unit performance and low availability of slack,
and prior experience with divestitures appear as the main drivers of
subsequent divestitures. Finally, organizational learning theory,
portfolio theory and the BTOF, rather than agency theory, seem to be
better suited to explain divestiture decisions.

Theoretical implications
A somewhat surprising finding, given the broad reliance on
agency theory in prior research, is the fact that the theory received
very weak support in the study (only one out of four relationships
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followed agency theory logic). While independent boards might benefit
shareholder value via encouraging divestitures, managerial ownership
exacerbates the problem, and large external shareholders and lack of
duality do not help. This raises the question: What do these results
mean for future research on corporate governance and agency theory?
I argue that scholars need to go beyond the predominant economic
focus of agency theory, where firm value is seen through the lens of
economic returns. Rather, I propose that agency theory examines
different types of value measured by socio-emotional wealth, firm
identification and preservation of firm boundaries. For example, it is an
interesting avenue for future research to compare family firms and
public firms. I expect that, among the former, socio-emotional wealth
and maintaining the firm intact will have much greater priority
compared with public firms (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). As a result,
family firms may be less likely to divest, even if corporate units
underperform. Furthermore, I expect to see differences in the
applicability of agency theory across different institutional regimes. In
particular, countries such as the USA and UK focus more on the
protection of shareholders’ interests, while countries such as Germany
and Japan emphasize the interests of employees (e.g. La Porta et al.,
2000). This may indicate that divestitures are less likely to happen in
the latter institutional regimes, since divestitures would negatively
affect existing employees and morale of the firm.
The results show that large external shareholders do not affect
the likelihood of divesting. While this may seem surprising, it could be
attributed to the way large external shareholders have been
operationalized in prior research. While the majority of divestiture
research has employed the classical agency theory view of
homogeneity among large external shareholders, more recent research
shows that different types of large external shareholders, such as
dedicated or transient, exhibit different associations with firm strategic
actions (Connelly et al., 2010). In particular, dedicated external
shareholders exhibit long-term orientation, and transient shareholders
are more short-term oriented. This suggests that the former might be
more tolerant and patient with underperforming firms (Koh, 2007)
before encouraging the divestiture of weak corporate units. On the
contrary, the latter shareholders are more interested in quick gains
(Porter, 1992), which makes them less tolerant towards
underperforming units.
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Firm strategy determinants were the strongest drivers of
divestitures. I am not surprised that structural factors, such as firm
size and level of diversification, which relate to internal organizational
efficiency, take priority in managerial focus of attention (Ocasio, 1997)
and play a dominant role in the decision to divest. In addition, these
results point at the relative efficacy and applicability of portfolio theory
to divestitures and its strong predictive power.
The single strongest predictor of divestitures is prior
divestitures. This finding suggests that managers are able to obtain
valuable lessons from prior divestitures, encode this knowledge in
organizational routines, and successfully use it in future similar
strategic actions. Thus, being involved in prior divestitures enhances
the confidence and skills of managers to continue with future
divestitures. As result, I find strong support for organizational learning
theory as an underlying theory in research on divestitures. Still, those
findings do not elaborate on the potential contingencies in the
relationship between prior divestiture experience and future
divestment. One such contingency is the elapsed time between
divestitures. Prior research on strategic decision-making, including
acquisitions, finds evidence that the best way for managers to learn
from prior activities is by spacing those activities not too close or too
far apart from each other (Aktas, de Bodt and Roll, 2013; Hayward,
2002). Translating this logic to divestiture suggests that, if the interval
between divestitures is too long, it could reduce the likelihood of
subsequent divestitures, because managers might forget some of the
routines and practices associated with prior divestitures. Another
important contingency that deserves attention in future research is the
type of divestiture experience that managers have accumulated. I
argue that, if managers had conducted successful divestitures in the
past, they would be more confident and willing to engage in future
divestitures.
The results show that prior acquisitions do not appear to predict
subsequent divestitures. We envision several explanations for these
results. First, acquisitions are large strategic events that are closely
followed by financial experts, and their subsequent divestiture would
indicate that those acquisitions were inappropriate. No manager is
willing to admit such mistakes (e.g. McNamara, Moon and Bromiley,
2002). Second, acquisitions are rather different from divestitures,
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which might prevent the transfer of experience and practices from the
former to the latter. While acquisitions require the appropriate
integration of new units, assets and employees to existing
organizational routines, divestitures necessitate the appropriate
disposal of current organizational assets. Third, the data allowed me to
code only the number of prior acquisitions, without distinguishing
between successful and unsuccessful acquisitions. It is a fruitful
avenue for future research to study whether number of acquisitions
interacts with acquisition performance to jointly predict corporate
divestitures.
Overall, I find relative support that BTOF and performance
determinants explain divestiture decisions well. In particular, poor unit
performance leads to its divestiture, suggesting that managers
carefully monitor and review corporate units and make appropriate
decisions to divest weak units and keep well-performing ones.
Interestingly, poor corporate performance exhibited no impact on
divestitures. It may be that, while poor corporate performance might
reflect the general financial position of the firm, it is harder for
managers to identify precisely the source of corporate losses (Hayward
and Shimizu, 2006) and thus blame a particular division.
Finally, industry conditions appear to have no impact on
divestitures. Such a finding is not very surprising, given prior evidence
that many firms are not responsive to industry prospects when making
strategic decisions (Arrfelt et al., 2015). A potential explanation for
this result is the fact that environmental factors may be less salient
cues to managers regarding divestitures (e.g. Ocasio, 1997). In other
words, managers may be more attentive to and respond more strongly
to internal firm factors that dominate their focus of attention. In a
similar vein, managers may have greater control over internal firm
factors compared with environmental conditions, which would allow
them to use divestitures in response to deficiencies in those internal
factors.
The overall results of my integrative framework confirmed the
expectations of which categories of antecedents will be the strongest
drivers of corporate divestitures. Firm strategy determinants, such as
firm size, firm diversification and prior divestitures, and performance
determinants, mainly prior unit performance, have the biggest impact
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on the decision to divest. These are followed by corporate governance
determinants, such as managerial equity and outsider-dominated
boards. Those findings indicate that portfolio theory, organizational
learning theory and, to a certain extent, BTOF are the major theories
underlying corporate divestitures.
While it is critical to assess the magnitude of individual effect
sizes between antecedents and divestitures and determine which are
the strongest predictors, it is also important to evaluate the results
from a comparative lens. In particular, I benchmarked the magnitude
of obtained effect sizes to other meta-analyses examining strategic
decision-making and/or the constructs that I used (Dalton et al., 2003;
Deutsch, 2005; Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar, 2006; Sleesman
et al., 2012). Overall, the correlations between my antecedent factors
and corporate divestitures are similar and even larger in magnitude
compared with the correlations examined in those prior metaanalyses. This indicates that those results have theoretical and
practical significance, and the theories outlined could serve as a
starting point to promote further theorizing (e.g. Bosco et al., 2012).

Practical implications
The findings from this meta-analysis also offer some useful
insight for managers and shareholders. In terms of corporate
governance antecedents, stacking the boards with independent
directors seems to produce results that are in line with shareholder
interests and wealth maximization. However, the common argument of
managerial ownership exacerbates the problem of executive selfserving behavior, and I advise reconsideration of managerial pay
design especially in terms of divestiture outcomes. Moreover,
conducting multiple prior divestitures could be seen as valuable
managerial experience, which helps in future corporate restructuring
and value enhancement – when firms undertake divestitures, they
have to put in charge of this process people with the relevant prior
experience. However, when managers transfer experiences between
different restructuring modes, such as transferring acquisition
experience to divestitures, beneficial financial outcomes are not
guaranteed.
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Limitations and future research opportunities
I have to point out some limitations of the meta-analysis. First,
I was constrained to the availability of prior empirical studies and had
to discard multiple studies that were qualitative in nature or lacked
sufficient quantitative statistics to estimate effect sizes. Also, I am
dependent on the quality and methodological rigor of the studies used
in the meta-analysis. For example, I see certain limitations with the
way large external shareholders have been measured in prior
research. The aggregation of large external shareholders into a
homogeneous category precludes identifying the inherent differences
between various types of those shareholders and their different
orientation and approach to divestitures. Such a limitation opens an
avenue for future research to examine potential moderating
conditions. For example, type of shareholders, various institutional
regimes, types of firms (family vs public firms) and success of prior
acquisitions appear to be important moderating factors that deserve
future examination.
Second, while the meta-analysis included only studies where the
various antecedents were measured before the divestiture event, it is
still not possible to infer complete causality. Future research could
address this issue by carefully controlling for third variables and
relying more exclusively on cross-lagged panel designs and
appropriate estimation techniques.
I posit that future studies could use additional theories to
explain divestitures. One such theoretical perspective is transaction
cost economics (TCE) (Williamson, 1985). Considering that TCE
theorizes on boundaries of the firm, it would be interesting to examine
the direct impact of TCE and factors such as asset specificity and risk
preferences on managerial choices to undertake divestitures.
Relatedly, I posit that the resource-based view perspective (Barney,
1991) has been underused in divestiture research. In particular,
viewing corporate units through the lens of valuable, rare, inimitable
and non-substitutable resources could explain why certain units are
not divested despite weak profitability. Finally, upper echelon theory
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984) fits well with divestitures. Since
corporate decisions and strategic actions are a reflection of managerial
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characteristics, it would be a fruitful avenue to study how managerial
demographic characteristics, managerial dispositional traits and
various types of diversity, including gender diversity, among top
executives, affect decisions to divest. For example, because diversity
among top executives generates conflict and reduces the ability to
reach consensus (Harrison et al., 2002; Pelled, 1996), I expect that
divestitures are less likely to happen in firms with greater diversity
among top executives.
In summary, this meta-analysis aimed to develop an integrative
framework to organize divestiture antecedents, examine which of
those antecedents have the strongest impact on the decision to divest,
and assess which underlying theories have the highest predictive
power in terms of divestitures. I hope that my study provides valuable
insights and suggestions for future research on divestitures and will
spur the additional interest and attention that this phenomenon
deserves.
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Appendix: Moderation analyses of the relationship between
antecedents and corporate divestitures
Variable

Supported

N

k

r

ρ

SD

95% CI

90% CV

Corporate governance (H1)
Large external
shareholders

No

6602

14 0.02

0.03

After 1990

2302

4 −0.02 −0.03 0.06 −0.10 0.04

0.10

Before 1990

2542

6 0.03

0.11 −0.05 0.14

−0.10 0.18

0.04

0.08 −0.02 0.08

−0.08 0.13
0.05

Firm strategy (H2)
Level of
diversification

27,162 19 0.07

0.09

0.10 0.04

0.14

−0.04 0.22

After 1990

6684

7 0.06

0.07

0.12 −0.02 0.16

−0.09 0.23

Before 1990

1759

7 0.25

0.32

0.15 0.19

0.44

0.12

Multi industry

23,450 15 0.06

0.08

0.10 0.02

0.13

−0.05 0.21

Single industry

3712

4 0.12

0.15

0.04 0.10

0.20

0.10

53,008 27 0.27

0.33

0.34 0.20

0.46

−0.10 0.77

After 1990

22,570 12 0.29

0.36

0.26 0.21

0.52

0.02

0.69

Before 1990

9674

5 0.66

0.82

0.28 0.58

1.1

0.46

1.2

Multi industry

39,276 20 0.17

0.22

0.25 0.11

0.33

−0.10 0.53

Single industry

13,732 7 0.54

0.67

0.34 0.42

0.92

0.23

Firm size

Prior
acquisitions

Yes

Yes

No

0.51
0.20

1.1

7126

8 0.026 0.033 0.17 −0.09 0.15

−0.19 0.25

Multi industry

1249

5 0.10

0.12

0.06 0.04

0.04

Single industry

5877

3 0.01

0.01

0.18 −0.19 0.22

−0.22 0.24

0.20

0.20

Performance (H3)
Prior corporate
No
performance

29,633 24 0.02

0.02

0.10 −0.02 0.06

−0.11 0.15

After 1990

22,837 11 0.03

0.04

0.10 −0.02 0.10

−0.08 0.16
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Variable

Supported

N

k

r

ρ

SD

95% CI

90% CV

Before 1990

1453

Multi industry

24,267 18 0.01

0.01

0.11 −0.04 0.07

−0.13 0.15

Single industry

5366

0.04

0.05 −0.002 0.09

−0.02 0.10

Firm slack
resources

Yes

4 −0.14 −0.18 0.05 −0.24 −0.11 −0.24 −0.12
6 0.04

24,771 24 −0.03 −0.04 0.06 −0.07 −0.01 −0.12 0.04

After 1990

17,859 9 −0.03 −0.04 0.05 −0.07 −0.01 −0.10 0.02

Before 1990

1759

Multi industry

20,155 18 −0.03 −0.04 0.05 −0.07 −0.05 −0.10 0.02

Single industry

4616

7 −0.01 −0.02 0.14 −0.13 0.10
6 −0.04 −0.06 0.10 −0.14 0.03

−0.20 0.16
−0.19 0.08

aN

= combined sample size; k = number of correlations; r = raw score correlation; ρ
= corrected true score population correlation; SD = standard deviation of true score
population correlation; CI = confidence interval; CV = credibility interval.

Unpublished studies are excluded, since they have not been vetted in
the review process. As a result, there is a higher level of uncertainty
about the quality in terms of methodological rigor and reliability of
empirical findings with unpublished studies compared with published
studies.
1

Additional analyses were conducted using 0.7 and 1.0 reliability
estimates, and there were no significant differences in results. Thus,
only results with 0.8 reliability levels are reported. Supplementary
results are available from the author on request.
2

The author would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this
suggestion.
3
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